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I. Introduction
There has been real frustration with the SEC and other 
government agencies for not holding individuals responsible for 
the excessive risk-taking th a t was a principal cause of the 2008 to 
2009 global financial crisis (Financial Crisis) and its associated 
banking failures.2 Enforcement has focused instead on the 
financial firms themselves.3
But being managed by individuals, firms themselves are the 
second-best targets of deterrence. Targeting m anagers in their 
personal capacity is thus widely viewed as a greater, and perhaps 
a more optimal, deterrent than  firm-level liability.4 Better 
deterrence is critical because insufficient deterrence could sow the 
seeds—as may already be occurring—for future systemic 
meltdowns. Targeting m anagers in their personal capacity can 
also help to increase accountability and fairness.
Moreover, firm-level liability can impose significant 
externalities on th ird  parties. The prosecution of A rthur
2 See, e.g., Ted Kaufman: Wall Street Prosecutions Never Made a Priority, Frontline, PBS 
(Jan. 22, 2013, 9:41 PM), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-econo 
myfinancial-crisis/untouchables/ted-kaufman-wall-street-proseetions-never-made-a-priority/ 
(expressing frustration and disappointment with his own political party that there were no 
prosecutions for the misconduct leading to the Financial Crisis).
3 In August 2012, for example, the U.S. Department of Justice determined that it had no 
basis to prosecute Goldman Sachs employees in regard to allegations in the Levin-Coburn 
report that Goldman Sachs made large profits from marketing CDO Securities backed by 
subprime mortgage loans as safe investments to clients, while betting against the same 
securities. See Dominique Debucquoy-Dodley, No “Viable Basis” to Prosecute Goldman, 
Justice Department Says, CNN (Aug. 10, 2012, 7:13 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/09/busi 
ness/goldman-justice-department/. Goldman Sachs nonetheless paid $550 million is 
settlement of civil claims with regard to the activity in question. Phil Mattingly et al., U.S. 
Agencies Probing Goldman Findings After Senate Referral, BLOOMBERG (May 4, 2011, 12:01 
AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-05-03/Levin-report-accusing-goldman-of-d 
eception-referred-to-u-s-justice-sec.
4 See Cedric Argenton & Eric Van Damme, Optimal Deterrence of Illegal Behavior Under 
Imperfect Corporate Governance 26 (Tilburg L. & Econ. Ctr., Working Paper No. 2014-053, 
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2540155 (arguing that 
personal Lability is needed in addition to firm-level Lability to reach the optimal level of 
deterring corporate moral hazard).
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Andersen, for example, caused tens of thousands of employees to 
lose their jobs .5 Firm-level liability can also h u rt innocent 
stockholders and creditors, who will suffer a loss in the value of 
their securities.
II. Systemic Risk Is Complicating What Risk-Taking Is
Excessive
To understand why post-financial crisis prosecution has focused 
so heavily on firm-level liability and not personal liability, I have 
been examining changes th a t may be impeding the imposition of 
personal liability for excessive corporate risk-taking .6 One of the 
most im portant changes, which I would like to speak about today, 
is th a t systemic risk is complicating the very concept of “excessive” 
risk-taking.
Our increasingly competitive and complex global economy 
requires firms to take ever greater risks to innovate and create 
economic value. Because unsophisticated attem pts to curtail 
corporate risk-taking could inadvertently destroy th a t value , 7 it is 
critical to be able to distinguish appropriate from excessive risk ­
taking.
U ntil the Financial Crisis, it seemed relatively easy to make 
th a t distinction by taking into account the consequences of 
corporate risk-taking. Most observers assumed th a t a firm ’s 
failure would primarily, if not exclusively, harm  its investors. 
Accordingly, corporate risk-taking was assessed—and therefore 
“excessive” risk-taking was implicitly defined—by its potential
5 Robert Hennelly, Has General Motors Learned Its $900 Million Lesson?, CBS NEWS 
(Sept. 18, 2015, 3:48 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/has-general-motors-learned-its-les 
son/.
6 See generally Schwarcz, supra note 1.
1 See Eduardo Porter, Recession’s True Cost Is Still Being Tallied, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.eom/2014/01/22/business/economy/thecost.-nf-t.bp-finanrial-cviaia-ig.i] 
till-being-tallied.html (observing that regulations that require financial institutions to 
increase capital cushions to buffer against risks and potential losses have been criticized for 
cutting into global economic output and reducing jobs).
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impact on those investors, typically focusing on the tension 
between risk-seeking shareholders and more risk-averse 
creditors.8
In most circumstances, the interests of shareholders would 
trum p those of creditors,9 who, nonetheless, could try  to bargain to 
protect their (risk-averse) interests through contractual covenants 
in their loan agreements. The responsibilities of a firm’s 
managers, who run  the firm as agents for the investors, to engage 
in corporate risk-taking were therefore prim arily driven by 
shareholder interests. Moreover, the enforcement of those 
responsibilities was delegated to privately enforced rights, through 
such means as shareholder derivative suits.
Systemic risk—in this context, the risk th a t a financial firm’s 
failure will impact other financial firms or m arkets, resulting in a 
domino-type collapse th a t ultim ately harm s the real economy—is 
complicating corporate risk-taking, creating ambiguity about w hat 
am ount of risk-taking is excessive and confusing even corporate 
law experts about when risk-taking th a t causes a firm to fail 
should be penalized as excessive.10
The substantive source of confusion is th a t the failure of a 
“systemically im portant” firm can harm  not only its investors but 
also, by triggering a systemic collapse, the public a t large. C urrent 
law does not require firms to fully internalize th a t cost. As a 
result, a firm may well decide to engage in a transaction th a t is 
expected to be profitable—thereby favorable to its investors and 
thus appropriate corporate risk-taking under existing corporate
8 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporations Obligations to Creditors, 17 
CARDOZO L. REV. 647, 679 (1996). Shareholders tend to be risk-seeking because they typically 
benefit fully from an increase in a firm’s value but only are harmed by a decrease. Creditors 
tend to be more risk-averse because they typically do not benefit from an increase in a firm’s 
value and are harmed by a fall in the firm’s value that causes insolvency. Id. at 674.
9 See id. at 665 (“In general, directors of a solvent corporation owe fiduciary obligations 
solely to shareholders.”).
10 Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard: 
Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in Germany and the United States, 40 
SETON Hall L. Rev. 1433, 1438, 1441, 1465 (2010) (observing the controversy over “whether 
there is any such thing as excessive risk, and if so, how excessive risk is to be defined”).
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governance law—even though doing so could increase systemic 
risk, since much of the harm  from a resulting systemic collapse 
would be externalized onto other m arket participants, as well as 
onto ordinary citizens impacted by an economic collapse .11
Nobody is speaking for the public’s in terest in avoiding systemic 
harm  when firms engage in corporate risk-taking. That voice 
needs to be heard.
III. What Should Be Done?
I have separately examined various ways to impose personal 
liability in order to control and internalize the costs of excessive 
corporate risk-taking .12 I am also separately considering the 
extent to which imposing personal liability should supplement, or 
substitu te  for, other ways of regulating control of th a t risk­
tak ing . 13 Today’s ta lk  focuses on imposing a public governance 
duty, assuming, arguendo, th a t should a t least supplem ent other 
ways of regulating excessive risk-taking.
A. IMPOSING A PUBLIC GOVERNANCE DUTY
Because corporate risk-taking can impact the public in addition 
to impacting investors, one way of controlling excessive risk-taking 
would be to require the m anagers of a systemically im portant firm 
to run  the firm as agents, not merely for the investors, but also for 
the public. To th a t extent, such m anagers would not only have a
11 This could be described as a type of “tragedy of the commons,” insofar as market 
participants suffer from the actions of other market participants. Robert T. Miller, 
Oversight Liability for Risk Management Failures at Financial Firms, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 
110 (2010). But it also is a more standard externality insofar as non-market participants 
(i.e., the ordinary citizens impacted by an economic collapse) suffer from the actions of 
market participants. Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and 
Limits of Law, 2012 WlS. L. REV. 815, 821.
12 See generally Schwarcz, supra note 1.
13 Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty (Duke Law 
Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Series No. 2015-40, 2015), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=264 
4375.
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private corporate governance duty to investors but also a public 
corporate governance duty to society (public governance duty) not 
to engage in excessive risk-taking th a t could harm  the public.14 
M anagers who breach this public governance duty should then 
be—ju st as m anagers who breach their private governance duty to 
investors already are—subject to personal liability for breach of 
their principal-agent relationship.
This reform ulation of corporate governance law raises several 
practical questions about how a firm’s m anagers should perform 
their public governance duty:
• How should m anagers assess the potential 
impact on the public of corporate risk-taking?
• How should m anagers balance public costs and 
private benefits when deciding w hether the firm 
should engage in a given risk-taking activity?
• Who should actually sue to impose personal 
liability on m anagers who breach their public 
governance duty by engaging their firms in 
excessive risk-taking?
Consider these questions in turn.
14 Cf. John Carney, Big-Bank Board Game Puts Shareholders in Second Place, WALL St. 
J. (Apr. 5, 2015, 1:36 PM) (noting a speech by U.S. Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo 
suggesting that “corporate governance would need to change to broaden the scope of boards’ 
fiduciary duties to reflect macroprudential [, i.e., systemic,] regulatory objectives”). The 
nation of Iceland has actually enacted legislation that appears to require, at least in 
principle, the managers of at least certain systemically important firms to 
“operate] ] . . . [their firms] in the interests o f . . . shareholders . . . and the entire economy.” 
Act on Financial Undertakings (Act. No. 161/2002) (Ice.) (unofficial English translation), 
available at http://eng.atvinnuvegaraduneyti.is/laws-and-regulations/nr/nr/7366. The Dean 
of the University of Iceland’s law faculty believes this law “puts clear constraints on the 
directors and managers” of those firms and “underlines the difference between” those firms 
“and other companies that usually have the only purpose of increasing shareholder value.” 
E-mail from Professor Eyvindur G. Gunnarsson, Dean, Faculty of Law, Univ. of Ice., to 
author (Feb. 14, 2015, 6:28 PM ) (on file with author).
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B. ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE PUBLIC
How should m anagers assess the potential impact on the public 
of corporate risk-taking? As w ith any other type of corporate 
action, it is difficult, ex ante, to precisely predict ex post 
consequences. That difficulty would likely be even greater when 
predicting consequences to the public, not merely to the firm and 
its investors.
In the traditional corporate governance context, m anagerial 
decisions—including risk-taking decisions—are protected to some 
extent by the business judgm ent rule, which presumes th a t 
m anagers should not be personally liable for harm  caused by 
negligent decisions made in good faith and without conflicts of 
in terest—and, in some articulations of the business judgm ent rule, 
also w ithout gross negligence . 15 On its face, a t least, the business 
judgm ent rule should apply to m anagers trying to predict 
consequences to the public of corporate risk-taking. But given 
those public consequences, should the business judgm ent rule be 
modified to make it easier to impose personal liability for excessive 
risk-taking th a t causes systemic harm?
In a traditional context (i.e., w ithout regard to systemic risk), at 
least two scholars have considered and rejected argum ents to 
weaken the business judgm ent rule for excessive risk-taking. 
Professor Christine H urt has rejected any such weakening of the 
rule as im prudent and, insofar as the exercise of m anagerial 
business judgm ent is inappropriate for court review, 
unm anageable . 16 She also has said th a t it would be inconsistent 
w ith corporate law principles to impose personal liability for poor 
m anagerial judgment. It should be up to shareholders, she has 
argued, to evaluate corporate risk through their investm ent
15 Christine Hurt, The Duty to Manage Risk, 39 J. CORP. L. 253, 258-59 (2014).
16 Id. at 259-60, 289-91.
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decisions, not through litigation.17 Professor Robert Miller has 
adopted sim ilar argum ents in rejecting any such weakening of the 
business judgm ent ru le.18
To the extent those argum ents assume th a t shareholders 
evaluate risk through the ir investm ent decisions, the argum ents 
are irrelevant to the question of imposing personal liability for 
excessive risk-taking th a t causes public harm . A firm’s 
shareholders would have no incentive—and thus are highly 
unlikely no m atter w hat the liability standard—to sue managers 
for engaging in excessively systemically risky actions. To the 
contrary, shareholders generally w ant their firms to take 
potentially profitable risks, regardless of the possible systemic 
impact.
Nonetheless, the inappropriate-for-court-review p art of those 
argum ents should have m erit no m atter who, a shareholder or a 
government prosecutor, is attem pting to impose personal liability. 
It generally would be im practical for a judge, who typically lacks 
business experience, to review business m anagem ent decisions.
For two reasons, however, I believe th a t the public in terest 
requires some weakening of the business judgm ent rule. Members 
of the public, unlike shareholders, cannot m itigate their harm  by 
voting to replace m anagers or selling stock. Even more 
significantly, public harm  breaches one of the basic assum ptions of 
the business judgm ent ru le’s application—-that there be no conflict
17 Id. at 258 (“[Shareholders can sell shares of companies that are poorly managed, and 
companies can fire poorly performing managers; imposing liability through a shareholder 
suit is the least efficient way to discipline management.”).
18 Miller, supra note 11, at 103 (“Legally, any meaningful expansion of Caremark liability 
would amount to a revolution in Delaware law tantamount to repealing the business 
judgment rule, a result that would be so obviously inefficient as to be incontrovertibly out of 
the question. Economically, even apart from the inefficiencies involved in repealing the 
business judgment rule, the desired expansion of Caremark to control so-called excessive 
risk taking would be misguided because the kinds of excessive risk taking that expanded 
oversight liability are not the kinds of excessive risk taking that may have contributed to 
the financial crisis.”).
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of interest.19 The interest of a manager who holds significant 
shares or interests in shares, or whose compensation or retention 
is dependent on share price, is aligned with the firm’s 
shareholders, not with that of the public. To that extent, the 
manager would have a conflict of interest.20
Managers who are conflicted in that way should not be given 
quite the same absolute deference that the business judgment rule 
gives non-conflicted managers. I therefore argue that the rule 
should not protect conflicted managers who are grossly negligent— 
that is, who fail to use even slight care.
Technically, this approach does not even change the business 
judgment rule; it merely applies the gross negligence standard 
that is articulated as part of that rule, though rarely utilized with 
any rigor. And because courts routinely review whether other 
types of actions are grossly negligent,21 they should not find it 
inappropriate or impractical to review corporate risk-taking 
actions under a gross negligence standard. As a practical matter, 
furthermore, managers who follow a reasonable procedure to 
balance public costs and private benefits—perhaps one akin to the 
procedure next discussed—should be protected.22
19 Rachel E. Schwartz, The Clawback Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley: An Underutilized 
Incentive to Keep the Corporate House Clean, 64 BUS. Law. 1, 31 n.202 (2008) (“Of course, 
deference, in the form of the business judgment rule, is given to management decisions in 
the absence of a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders.” (citing Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984))).
20 I recognize that courts applying the business judgment rule usually look for conflicts of 
interest between managers, on the one hand, and the firm and its shareholders, on the 
other hand. Logically, however, if, as this Article argues, the managers should also have a 
duty to the public, then the notion of conflicts should be broadened to include conflicts 
between managers, on the one hand, and the public, on the other hand.
21 See, e.g., John Schwartz, Judge’s Ruling on Gulf Oil Spill Lowers Ceiling on the Fine BP 
is Facing, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/16/business/energy-en 
vironmen/judge-sets-toppenalty-for-bp-in-deepwater-horizon-spill-at-nearly-14-bilhon.html?_r 
=0 (observing that Judge Carl J. Barbier of the Federal District Court in New Orleans found 
BP grossly negligent in causing the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill).
22 That would effectively conform the business judgment rule’s application to a duty of 
process care, the standard commonly used in the United States.
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C. BALANCING PUBLIC COSTS AND PRIVATE BENEFITS
How should m anagers balance public costs and private benefits 
when deciding whether the firm should engage in a given risk ­
taking activity? I have considered a somewhat parallel question in 
the context of examining how m anagers of a firm in the “vicinity of 
insolvency,” who then run  the firm as agents not only for the 
shareholders but also for the creditors, should balance their ex 
ante assessm ent of costs to creditors and benefits to shareholders 
when deciding w hether the firm should engage in a given risk ­
taking activity.23 In th a t context, I argued th a t “where non­
comparable commodities of benefit and harm  to different parties 
are being weighed, the benefit may have to considerably outweigh 
the harm  . . .  to be justified.”24
That approach follows a cost-benefit balancing th a t includes a 
semi-strong form of the precautionary principle. Precautionary 
principles are applied when balancing the costs and benefits of 
activities th a t can pose great harm —which in our case would be 
systemic harm . The “considerably outweigh” requirem ent not only 
shifts the burden to prove th a t the risk-taking activity should be 
perm itted to the proponent of th a t activity but also requires a 
m argin of safety.25 This same approach could be used to balance 
the public costs and private benefits of corporate risk-taking.
Using this approach, excessive corporate risk-taking should 
mean risk-taking for which the private benefits to investors are 
not expected to considerably outweigh any systemic costs to the 
public. M anagers who engage systemically im portant firms in 
such risk-taking would have violated their public governance duty 
and thus should be subject to personal liability. The managers
23 Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 669-77.
24 Id. at 676-77.
25 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. Rev. 
1003 (2003) (discussing an use of a precautionary principle that includes provision for a 
margin of safety in regulatory efforts).
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nonetheless should be protected by the business judgm ent rule if 
they acted in good faith and without gross negligence.
One might ask why a normative analysis should ever weigh 
costs and benefits to different parties—in our case, a firm’s 
investors and the public. One answer is th a t public 
policymaking—and indeed the very notion of cost-benefit 
analysis—relies on the Kaldor-Hicks concept of efficiency, under 
which a public project is regarded as efficient if its overall benefits 
exceed its overall costs regardless of who bears the costs and who 
gets the benefits .26 Admittedly, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency implicitly 
assum es th a t the distribution of benefits and costs is not controlled 
by the party—in our case, a firm’s m anagers—also controlling the 
decision w hether to engage in the project.27 But those managers 
do not completely control the distribution of benefits; the public 
usually benefits, a t least indirectly, from corporate risk-taking 
th a t benefits investors.
Next consider expected value examples of how th a t weighing of 
costs and benefits could be done. Assume a systemically im portant 
firm is considering engaging in a risky project th a t could be 
profitable. The firm’s m anagers value in good faith the following 
outcomes. They also perform at least a minimally appropriate 
inquiry to reach their valuations. That would enable them  to be 
protected by the business judgm ent rule if, in retrospect, they 
made incorrect valuations.
26 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 1.2 (6th ed. 2003).
27 Robin Paul Malloy, Law in a Market Context 190-91 (2004). Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency aims to maximize society’s aggregate utility. Id. Legal reasoning concerning non­
voluntary or non-consensual transactions employs the Kaldor-Hicks test as a hypothetical 
efficiency standard in considering “what rules and institutional mechanisms might best 
advance social welfare.” Id. at 191. Additionally “[w]hen a right is protected by a liability 
rule it is subject to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency analysis and can be subject to a forced exchange 
if social utility can be enhanced.” Id.
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Expected, value of the project to investors (usually the 
shareholders)
[(X% chance of project being successful) x $Y  profit 
from th a t success] — [(1-X% chance of project being 
unsuccessful) x $Wloss from th a t failure]
Expected value of the project’s systemic costs 
[(1-X% chance of project being unsuccessful) x F% 
chance of firm failing as a resu lt of the project being 
unsuccessful x $Z resulting systemic costs]28
W hat values should m anagem ent use? Most of these values 
would be pure business judgm ents about which the firm’s 
m anagers should have sufficient information, or a t least much 
more information than  th ird  parties. For example, those 
m anagers should have much more information than  th ird  parties 
about valuing X%, the chance of the project being successful; $Y, 
the profit from th a t success; $W, the loss from the project’s failure; 
and F%, the chance of the firm failing as a resu lt of the project’s 
failure (i.e., effectively as a resu lt of the .5“W loss).
The exception, however, is the value for $Z, the systemic costs if 
the firm fails. Government financial regulators are likely to know 
much more about valuing $Z than  the firm ’s managers. That 
valuation should therefore be a public policy choice.
As a policy m atter, there could be several possible ways of 
valuing $Z. One approach would be to assum e th a t the firm 
actually fails, with a systemically negative impact to the real 
economy. That would yield an indeterm inate but potentially huge 
num ber for $Z. But th a t valuation approach could be misleading
28 This equation has been simplified. The full equation would be [(1-X% chance of project 
being unsuccessful) x F% chance of firm failing as a result of the project being unsuccessful 
x $Z resulting systemic costs] + [(X% chance of project being successful) x A% chance of firm 
failing as a result of the project being successful x $B resulting systemic costs]. However, 
A%, the chance of the firm failing as a result of the project being successful, is likely to be 
zero.
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for at least two reasons. First, the failure of any given firm, no 
matter how large, would be unlikely by itself to be the sole cause of 
a major financial crisis; even Lehman Brothers’ failure did not, by 
itself, cause the Financial Crisis.29 Second, at least in the United 
States, the “living will” requirement under the Dodd-Frank Act is 
intended to minimize the systemic consequences of any given 
systemically important firm’s failure.30
A more plausible way to value $Z would be to estimate the costs 
of the firm’s failure to its immediate counterparties. The rationale 
for this approach is that first-order systemic consequences are 
much more likely to result from a systemically important firm’s 
failure than a full-blown financial collapse.31 Such a cost estimate 
was done for the possible failure of Long-Term Capital 
Management (LTCM), a large hedge fund whose losses in the 
Russian bond market brought it close to default.32 Analysts at JP
29 See Edward J. Estrada, The Immediate and Lasting Impacts of the 2008 Economic 
Collapse—Lehman Brothers, General Motors, and the Secured Credits Markets, 45 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 1111, 1115 (2011) (listing the collapse of Lehman Brothers as one of many factors 
contributing to the global financial crisis).
30 Jennifer Meyerowitz et al., A Dodd-Frank Living Wills Primer: What You Need to 
Know Now, 31-AUG. Am . BANKR. INST. J. 34, 34 (2012) (“As part of the goal to remove the 
risks to the financial system posed by ‘too big to fail’ institutions, § 165(d) of the Dodd- 
Frank Act requires ‘systemically important financial institutions’ to create ‘living wills’ to 
facilitate ‘rapid and orderly resolution, in the event of material financial distress or 
failure.’ ” (internal quotations omitted)).
31 This is especially true after the implementation of Dodd-Frank, which seeks to avoid 
systemic disruptions in the event of a failed institution. As former FDIC Chair Sheila Blair 
explained, “[T]he FDIC has come up with a viable strategy for resolving a large complex 
financial institution . . . .  The FDIC will take control of a holding company and put creditors 
and shareholders into a receivership where they, not taxpayers, will absorb any losses. This 
will allow the subsidiaries to remain operational, avoiding systemic disruptions, as the overall 
entity is unwound over time. Mike Konczal, Sheila Blair: Dodd-Frank Really Did End 
Taxpayer Bailouts, WASH. POST (May 18, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/ 
wp/2013/05/18/sheila-bair-dodd-frank-really-did-end-taxpayer-bailouts/.
32 Cf. Cheryl D. Block, Measuring the True Cost of Government Bailout, 88 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 149, 164 (2010) (observing that the Federal Reserve Bank facilitated “private market 
solutions” by bringing “private lenders and investors together to work out a rescue plan for 
Long Term Capital Management” (LTCM)); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 
193, 201 (2008).
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Morgan estim ated th a t LTCM’s failure would have cost its larger 
bank-creditors $500-$700 million each.33
Another plausible way to value $Z would be to base it on the 
estim ated cost of a government bailout to avoid a systemic failure. 
I will use this approach as an example, assum ing for illustrative 
purposes th a t the firm’s bailout cost would be $500 million. I’ll 
also assume th a t the firm’s m anagers estim ate the other values as 
follows:
X% (the chance of the project being successful) = 80%.
$Y  (the profit from th a t success) = $50 million.
$W  (the loss from the project’s failure) = $20 million.
F% (the chance of the firm failing as a resu lt of the 
project’s failure) = 10%.
Again, these values are solely illustrative. They rely on no hard 
empirical data, and a quantitative analysis is no better than  its 
assumptions.
Applying these values to the expected value equations yields 
the following:
Expected value of the project to shareholders 
= [(80% chance of project being successful) x $50 
million profit from th a t success] -  [(20% chance of 
project being unsuccessful) x $20 million loss from th a t 
failure]
= $36 million
Expected value of the project’s systemic costs 
-  [(20% chance of project being unsuccessful) x 10% 
chance of firm failing as a result of the project being 
unsuccessful x $500 million resulting systemic costs]
= $10 million
33 Schwarcz, supra note 32, at 237.
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If these values are realistic, the $36 million expected value to 
investors would considerably outweigh the $10 million expected 
systemic harm  to the public. A systemically im portant firm th a t 
undertakes the risky project in question would not therefore be 
engaging in excessive risk-taking.34
Much will depend on valuing $Z, the systemic cost if the firm 
fails. In my example, if $Z were estim ated at $1.5 billion (rather 
th an  $500 million), the expected value of the project’s systemic 
costs would equal $30 million.35 M anagers of a systemically 
im portant firm th a t undertakes the risky project in question might 
then  be charged w ith excessive risk-taking because the expected 
value of the private benefit ($36 million) to investors would not 
considerably outweigh the $30 million expected value of the 
systemic costs to the public.
D. SUING TO IMPOSE LIABILITY FOR BREACH OF THE PUBLIC 
GOVERNANCE DUTY
Who should actually sue to impose personal liability on 
m anagers who breach their public governance duty? Under 
existing corporate governance law, shareholder derivative suits 
are the prim ary means to impose liability on m anagers.36 
Shareholders would have no interest, however, in imposing 
liability on m anagers of their firm for externalizing systemic harm. 
Therefore, the government, by default, should have the right to 
impose th a t liability.
I also argue th a t members of the public themselves should be 
authorized and incentivized to sue. As a precedent, qui tam suits
34 Cf. supra note 22 and accompanying text (explaining that managers who follow a 
reasonable procedure to balance public costs and private benefits should be protected, 
thereby effectively conforming the business judgment rule’s application to a duty of process 
care).
35 As mentioned, the valuation of $Z should be a public policy choice. If (as I suggest) 
that valuation is based on the estimated cost of a government bailout to avoid a systemic 
failure, the process of designating a firm systemically important could include estimating 
that cost.
36 See supra note 1.
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under the False Claims Act are the prim ary litigation tool for 
combating fraud against the federal government. That Act 
perm its private citizens to sue alleged defrauders in the name of 
the United States government.37 If the suit is successful or settled, 
the citizen-plaintiff is entitled to as much as 30% of the award or 
settlem ent.38
These types of lawsuits raise a standing question; the citizen- 
plaintiff “suffers no in ju r / ’ and thus would appear to lack the 
“injury in fact” required to create Article III standing under the 
U.S. Constitution.39 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has found 
standing through a somewhat circular argum ent—th a t the Act’s 
“partia l assignm ent of the federal government’s claim to the 
[citizen-plaintiff]” provides a sufficient stake in the outcome to 
create Article III standing.40
That same circular argum ent could justify citizen standing to 
sue to impose personal liability on m anagers who breach their 
public governance duty, if those citizen-plaintiffs were entitled to a 
percentage of the award or settlem ent. Moreover, those citizen- 
plaintiffs would have an additional standing claim: as members of 
the public, they would be directly harm ed by a systemically 
im portant firm’s collapse.
37 David Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement Pathways: Lessons from Qui Tam 
Litigation, 114 COLUM. L. Rev. 1913, 1944 (2014).
38 Id.
39 Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 WlS. L. Rev 381 384
40 Id.
